پاورپوینت کامل Game Theory and Competitive Strategy 128 اسلاید در PowerPoint

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پاورپوینت کامل Game Theory and Competitive Strategy 128 اسلاید در PowerPoint

اسلاید ۴: Chapter 13Slide 4Gaming and Strategic Decisions“If I believe that my competitors are rational and act to maximize their own profits, how should I take their behavior into account when making my own profit-maximizing decisions”

اسلاید ۵: Chapter 13Slide 5Gaming and Strategic DecisionsNoncooperative versus Cooperative GamesCooperative GamePlayers negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategiesExample: Buyer and seller negotiating the price of a good or service or a joint venture by two firms (i.e. Microsoft and Apple) Binding contracts are possible

اسلاید ۶: Chapter 13Slide 6Gaming and Strategic DecisionsNoncooperative versus Cooperative GamesNoncooperative GameNegotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possibleExample: Two competing firms assuming the others behavior determine, independently, pricing and advertising strategy to gain market shareBinding contracts are not possible

اسلاید ۷: Chapter 13Slide 7Gaming and Strategic DecisionsNoncooperative versus Cooperative Games“The strategy design is based on understanding your opponent’s point of view, and (assuming you opponent is rational) deducing how he or she is likely to respond to your actions”

اسلاید ۸: Chapter 13Slide 8Gaming and Strategic DecisionsAn Example: How to buy a dollar bill1)Auction a dollar bill2)Highest bidder receives the dollar in return for the amount bid

اسلاید ۹: Chapter 13Slide 9Gaming and Strategic DecisionsAn Example3)Second highest bidder must pay the amount he or she bid4)How much would you bid for a dollar

اسلاید ۱۰: Chapter 13Slide 10Acquiring a CompanyScenarioCompany A: The AcquirerCompany T: The TargetA will offer cash for all of T’s sharesWhat price to offer

اسلاید ۱۱: Chapter 13Slide 11Acquiring a CompanyScenarioThe value of T depends on the outcome of a current oil exploration project.Failure: T’s value = $0Success: T’s value = $100/shareAll outcomes are equally likely

اسلاید ۱۲: Chapter 13Slide 12Acquiring a CompanyScenarioT’s value will be 50% greater with A’s management.A, must submit the proposal before the exploration outcome is known.T will not choose to accept or reject until after the outcome is known only to T.How much should A offer

اسلاید ۱۳: Chapter 13Slide 13Dominant StrategiesDominant StrategyOne that is optimal no matter what an opponent does.An ExampleA & B sell competing productsThey are deciding whether to undertake advertising campaigns

اسلاید ۱۴: Chapter 13Slide 14Payoff Matrix for Advertising GameFirm AAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseFirm B10, 515, 010, 26, 8

اسلاید ۱۵: Chapter 13Slide 15Payoff Matrix for Advertising GameFirm AAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseFirm B10, 515, 010, 26, 8ObservationsA: regardless of B, advertising is the bestB: regardless of A, advertising is best

اسلاید ۱۶: Chapter 13Slide 16Payoff Matrix for Advertising GameFirm AAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseFirm B10, 515, 010, 26, 8ObservationsDominant strategy for A & B is to advertiseDo not worry about the other playerEquilibrium in dominant strategy

اسلاید ۱۷: Chapter 13Slide 17Dominant StrategiesGame Without Dominant StrategyThe optimal decision of a player without a dominant strategy will depend on what the other player does.

اسلاید ۱۸: Chapter 13Slide 1810, 515, 020, 26, 8Firm AAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseFirm BModified Advertising Game

اسلاید ۱۹: Chapter 13Slide 1910, 515, 020, 26, 8Firm AAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseAdvertiseDon’tAdvertiseFirm BModified Advertising GameObservationsA: No dominant strategy; depends on B’s actionsB: AdvertiseQuestionWhat should A do (Hint: consider B’s decision

اسلاید ۲۰: Chapter 13Slide 20The Nash Equilibrium RevisitedDominant Strategies“I’m doing the best I can no matter what you do.”“You’re doing the best you can no matter what I do.”

اسلاید ۲۱: Chapter 13Slide 21The Nash Equilibrium RevisitedNash Equilibrium“I’m doing the best I can given what you are doing”“You’re doing the best you can given what I am doing.”

اسلاید ۲۲: Chapter 13Slide 22Examples With A Nash EquilibriumTwo cereal companiesMarket for one producer of crispy cerealMarket for one producer of sweet cerealEach firm only has the resources to introduce one cerealNoncooperativeThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedProduct Choice Problem

اسلاید ۲۳: Chapter 13Slide 23Product Choice ProblemFirm 1CrispySweetCrispySweetFirm 2-5, -510, 10-5, -510, 10

اسلاید ۲۴: Chapter 13Slide 24Product Choice ProblemFirm 1CrispySweetCrispySweetFirm 2-5, -510, 10-5, -510, 10QuestionIs there a Nash equilibriumIf not, whyIf so, how can it be reached

اسلاید ۲۵: Chapter 13Slide 25Beach Location GameScenarioTwo competitors, Y and C, selling soft drinksBeach 200 yards longSunbathers are spread evenly along the beachPrice Y = Price CCustomer will buy from the closest vendor

اسلاید ۲۶: Chapter 13Slide 26Beach Location GameWhere will the competitors locate (i.e. where is the Nash equilibrium)Ocean0BBeachA200 yardsC

اسلاید ۲۷: Chapter 13Slide 27Beach Location Game2)Examples of this decision problem include:Locating a gas stationPresidential electionsOcean0BBeachA200 yardsC

اسلاید ۲۸: Chapter 13Slide 28The Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMaximin StrategiesScenarioTwo firms compete selling file-encryption softwareThey both use the same encryption standard (files encrypted by one software can be read by the other – advantage to consumers)

اسلاید ۲۹: Chapter 13Slide 29The Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMaximin StrategiesScenarioFirm 1 has a much larger market share than Firm 2Both are considering investing in a new encryption standard

اسلاید ۳۰: Chapter 13Slide 30Maximin StrategyFirm 1Don’t investInvestFirm 20, 0-10, 1020, 10-100, 0Don’t investInvest

اسلاید ۳۱: Chapter 13Slide 31Maximin StrategyFirm 1Don’t investInvestFirm 20, 0-10, 1020, 10-100, 0Don’t investInvestObservationsDominant strategy Firm 2: InvestNash equilibriumFirm 1: investFirm 2: Invest

اسلاید ۳۲: Chapter 13Slide 32Maximin StrategyFirm 1Don’t investInvestFirm 20, 0-10, 1020, 10-100, 0Don’t investInvestObservationsIf Firm 2 does not invest, Firm 1 incurs significant lossesFirm 1 might play don’t investMinimize losses to 10 –maximin strategy

اسلاید ۳۳: Chapter 13Slide 33If both are rational and informedBoth firms investNash equilibriumThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMaximin Strategy

اسلاید ۳۴: Chapter 13Slide 34ConsiderIf Player 2 is not rational or completely informedFirm 1’s maximin strategy is to not investFirm 2’s maximin strategy is to invest.If 1 knows 2 is using a maximin strategy, 1 would investThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMaximin Strategy

اسلاید ۳۵: Chapter 13Slide 35Prisoners’ DilemmaPrisoner AConfessDon’t ConfessConfessDon’tConfessPrisoner B-5, -5-1, -10-2, -2-10, -1

اسلاید ۳۶: Chapter 13Slide 36Prisoners’ DilemmaPrisoner AConfessDon’t ConfessConfessDon’tConfessPrisoner B-5, -5-1, -10-2, -2-10, -1What is the:Dominant strategyNash equilibriumMaximin solution

اسلاید ۳۷: Chapter 13Slide 37Pure StrategyPlayer makes a specific choiceMixed StrategyPlayer makes a random choice among two or more possible actions based on a set of chosen probabilitiesThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMixed Strat