فایل ورد کامل استراتژی های تامین بودجه و سفارش دهی یک زنجیره تامین تحت قرارداد اختیار معامله

توجه : به همراه فایل word این محصول فایل پاورپوینت (PowerPoint) و اسلاید های آن به صورت هدیه ارائه خواهد شد

این مقاله، ترجمه شده یک مقاله مرجع و معتبر انگلیسی می باشد که به صورت بسیار عالی توسط متخصصین این رشته ترجمه شده است و به صورت فایل ورد (microsoft word) ارائه می گردد

متن داخلی مقاله بسیار عالی، پر محتوا و قابل درک می باشد و شما از استفاده ی آن بسیار لذت خواهید برد. ما عالی بودن این مقاله را تضمین می کنیم

فایل ورد این مقاله بسیار خوب تایپ شده و قابل کپی و ویرایش می باشد و تنظیمات آن نیز به صورت عالی انجام شده است؛ به همراه فایل ورد این مقاله یک فایل پاور پوینت نیز به شما ارئه خواهد شد که دارای یک قالب بسیار زیبا و تنظیمات نمایشی متعدد می باشد

توجه : در صورت مشاهده بهم ریختگی احتمالی در متون زیر ،دلیل ان کپی کردن این مطالب از داخل فایل می باشد و در فایل اصلی فایل ورد کامل استراتژی های تامین بودجه و سفارش دهی یک زنجیره تامین تحت قرارداد اختیار معامله،به هیچ وجه بهم ریختگی وجود ندارد

تعداد صفحات این فایل: ۴۴ صفحه

بخشی از مقاله انگلیسیعنوان انگلیسی:Financing and ordering strategies for a supply chain under the option contract~~en~~

Abstract

We study a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained retailer ordering via the option contract to satisfy uncertain demand from a single supplier. The retailer can apply for either a bank loan or trade credit from the supplier whenever necessary. In addition to economic revenue, the supplier has a relationship concern and takes the retailer’s revenue into consideration. By developing a Stackelberg game, we analyze the ordering and financing problems in the supply chain. The results show that in the presence of the retailer’s bankruptcy risk, the supplier should always finance the retailer at the risk-free interest rate. Given the supplier’s offer, the retailer will always prefer to raise money from the supplier due to the lower interest rate. Meanwhile, under trade credit, the supply chain’s efficiency is improved when the production cost is high but decreased when the production cost is low. Furthermore, our results show that the supplier’s relationship concern can improve the supply chain’s efficiency and the retailer’s revenue most of the time, but increase the retailer’s bankruptcy risk when the production cost is high, implying that the supplier’s attempt to help the retailer eventually harms its long-run survival.

Introduction

In business, many firms face the capital constraint, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According to a credit survey of 3,459 SMEs in the U.S., 47% applied for financing in 2015, while only half of those that did not apply had sufficient cash flow (Barkley et al., 2016). A similar situation exists in developing countries. For example, about half of the SMEs in developing countries applied for financing in 2011, for a total amount of US$2.1 to $2.6 trillion (Owens and Wilhelm, 2017). The capital constraint can severely stymie firms’ operations, so it has been considered as the biggest obstacle to firms’ growth (Xu and Birge, 2004; Ayyagari et al., 2017). However, many classic studies of operations management (OM) are based on the assumption of sufficient capital (e.g., Petruzzi and Dada, 1999; Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Cachon, 2003; Bernstein and Federgruen, 2005; Perakis and Roels, 2007), which means that their results may be less relevant to current business practice.

Commercial bank loans are a popular way for firms to deal with the capital constraint. However, due to complex application procedures and strict collateral requirements, SMEs are usually ruled out from financing via bank loans. For example, only 4.7% of working capital loans and 23.3% of bank loans are issued to SMEs in China (Tsai, 2015). Given this situation, trade credit is widely accepted by firms in various industries, especially for SMEs where such credit is extended by upstream partners within the same supply chain (Jing et al., 2012). For instance, in 2004, trade credit accounted for 22.9% of the liabilities in the non-financial industries in Canada (Chandler, 2009). In China, this ratio was 20% in 2012 (Lin and Chou, 2015). In 2007, 90% of worldwide merchandise trade, amounting to US$14 trillion, was underpinned by trade credit (Williams, 2008). To facilitate operations in SMEs and to improve the efficiency of the entire supply chain, large capital-rich upstream suppliers often provide trade credit financing services to downstream SMEs in practice. For example, Ford Motor Company provides wholesale loans to dealers to finance the purchase of vehicle inventory, as well as loans to dealers to finance working capital and improvements to dealership facilities, finance the purchase of dealership real estate, and finance other dealer vehicle programs via Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary by Ford Motor Company (Ford Motor Company, 2018). Gree Electric, a Chinese major appliances manufacturer, contracts with many small-sized dealers who suffer from severe budget constraints yet usually are not eligible for bank loans. Therefore, Gree Electric cooperates with insurance and bonding companies to provide loans to these small-sized dealers (Zhuhai Gree Group Finance Company, 2018), in order to develop and protect its distribution channels. After obtaining the loans, these dealers are able to make better operational decisions, especially ordering decisions with Gree. Through IBM Global Financing, a wholly-owned subsidiary of IBM, IBM helps its clients to get access to IBM software by offering them short and long term loans (IBM Global Financing, 2016). GE Capital offers various financing products exclusively to GE customers in capital intensive industries like healthcare and energy (GE Capital, 2018).

$$en!!