پاورپوینت کامل Markets with Asymmetric Information 78 اسلاید در PowerPoint

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پاورپوینت کامل Markets with Asymmetric Information 78 اسلاید در PowerPoint

اسلاید ۴: Chapter 17Slide 4IntroductionWe will study how imperfect information influences resource allocation and the price system.

اسلاید ۵: Chapter 17Slide 5Quality Uncertainty and the Market for LemonsThe lack of complete information when purchasing a used car increases the risk of the purchase and lowers the value of the car.

اسلاید ۶: Chapter 17Slide 6The Market for Used CarsAssumeBuyers and sellers can distinguish between high and low quality carsThere will be two marketsQuality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons

اسلاید ۷: The Lemons ProblemPHPLQHQLSHSLDHDL5,00050,00050,000The market for high and lowquality cars when buyers and sellerscan identify each car10,000DLDMDM75,00025,000With asymmetric information buyers will find it difficult to determine quality. They lower their expectations of the average quality ofused cars. Demand for low and high quality used cars shifts to DM.DLMDLMThe increase in QLreduces expectations anddemand to DLM. The adjustment processcontinues until demand = DL.

اسلاید ۸: Chapter 17Slide 8The Market for Used CarsWith asymmetric information:Low quality goods drive high quality goods out of the market.The market has failed to produce mutually beneficial trade.Too many low and too few high quality cars are on the market.Adverse selection occurs; the only cars on the market will be low quality cars.Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons

اسلاید ۹: Chapter 17Slide 9Implications of Asymmetric InformationMedical InsuranceQuestionIs it possible for insurance companies to separate high and low risk policy holdersIf not, only high risk people will purchase insurance.Adverse selection would make medical insurance unprofitable.The Market for Insurance

اسلاید ۱۰: Chapter 17Slide 10Implications of Asymmetric InformationAutomobile InsuranceQuestionsWhat impact does asymmetric information and adverse selection have on insurance rates and the delivery of automobile accident insuranceHow can the government reduce the impact of adverse selection in the insurance industryThe Market for Insurance

اسلاید ۱۱: Chapter 17Slide 11Implications of Asymmetric InformationThe Market for CreditAsymmetric information creates the potential that only high risk borrowers will seek loans.QuestionHow can credit histories help make this market more efficient and reduce the cost of credit

اسلاید ۱۲: Chapter 17Slide 12Implications of Asymmetric InformationThe Importance of Reputation and StandardizationAsymmetric Information and Daily Market DecisionsRetail salesAntiques, art, rare coinsHome repairsRestaurants

اسلاید ۱۳: Chapter 17Slide 13Implications of Asymmetric InformationQuestionHow can these producers provide high-quality goods when asymmetric information will drive out high-quality goods through adverse selection.AnswerReputation

اسلاید ۱۴: Chapter 17Slide 14Implications of Asymmetric InformationQuestionWhy do you look forward to a Big Mac when traveling even though you would never consider buying one at home.Holiday Inn once advertised “No Surprises” to address the issue of adverse selection.

اسلاید ۱۵: Chapter 17Slide 15Lemons in Major League BaseballAsymmetric information and the market for free agentsIf a lemons market exists, free agents should be less reliable (disabled) than renewed contracts.

اسلاید ۱۶: Chapter 17Slide 16Player DisabilityAll Players4.7312.55165.4Renewed players4.769.68103.4Free agents4.6717.23268.9Days Spent on Disabled List per SeasonPrecontractPostcontractPercentage Change

اسلاید ۱۷: Chapter 17Slide 17FindingsDays on the disabled list increase for both free agents and renewed players.Free agents have a significantly higher disability rate than renewed players.This indicates a lemons market.Lemons in Major League Baseball

اسلاید ۱۸: Chapter 17Slide 18QuestionIf you are a team owner, what steps would you take to reduce the asymmetric information for free agentsLemons in Major League Baseball

اسلاید ۱۹: Chapter 17Slide 19Market SignalingThe process of sellers using signals to convey information to buyers about the product’s quality helps buyers and sellers deal with asymmetric information.

اسلاید ۲۰: Chapter 17Slide 20Market SignalingStrong SignalTo be effective, a signal must be easier for high quality sellers to give than low quality sellers.ExampleHighly productive workers signal with educational attainment level.

اسلاید ۲۱: Chapter 17Slide 21Market SignalingA Simple Model of Job Market SignalingAssumeTwo groups of workersGroup I: Low productivity–AP & MP = 1Group II: High productivity–AP & MP = 2The workers are equally divided between Group I and Group II–AP for all workers = 1.5

اسلاید ۲۲: Chapter 17Slide 22Market SignalingA Simple Model of Job Market SignalingAssumeCompetitive Product MarketP = $10,000Employees average 10 years of employmentGroup I Revenue = $100,000 (10,000/yr. x 10)Group II Revenue = $200,000 (20,000/yr. X 10)

اسلاید ۲۳: Chapter 17Slide 23Market SignalingWith Complete Informationw = MRPGroup I wage = $10,000/yr.Group II wage = $20,000/yr.With Asymmetric Informationw = average productivityGroup I & II wage = $15,000

اسلاید ۲۴: Chapter 17Slide 24Market SignalingSignaling With Education to Reduce Asymmetric Informationy = education index (years of higher education)C = cost of attaining educational level yGroup I–CI(y) = $40,000yGroup II–CII(y) = $20,000y

اسلاید ۲۵: Chapter 17Slide 25Market SignalingSignaling With Education to Reduce Asymmetric InformationAssume education does not increase productivityDecision Rule:y* signals GII and wage = $20,000Below y* signals GI and wage = $10,000

اسلاید ۲۶: SignalingYears ofCollegeValue ofCollegeEduc.0$100KValue ofCollegeEduc.Years ofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KGroup IGroup IICI(y) = $40